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This paper is a sequel to the papers Baaz and Iemhoff (2006, 2009) [4,6] in which
an alternative skolemization method called eskolemization was introduced that, when
restricted to strong existential quantifiers, is sound and complete for constructive theories.
In this paper we extend the method to universal quantifiers and show that for theories
satisfying the witness property it is sound and complete for all formulas. We obtain a
Herbrand theorem from this, and apply the method to the intuitionistic theory of equality
and the intuitionistic theory of monadic predicates.
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1. Introduction
Skolemization occurs in many places in mathematics and computer science. Indeed, proofs of universal statements that
start with the sentence ‘‘Let c be an arbitrary element’’ implicitly use the fact that proving ∀xAx is equivalent to proving Ac
for an arbitrary element c. In computer science, skolemization is a powerful tool when used in combinationwith Herbrand’s
theorem. Together they provide a correspondence between predicate and propositional logic, which is the reason for their
important role in automated theorem proving and the investigation of the decidability of a theory.
Skolemization seems to be a method that is particularly useful in a classical setting, since for many nonclassical theories
the method is no longer complete, although it is sound in many cases. That is, for As being the skolemization of A, we often
have
⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ As,
but not
⊢ As ⇒ ⊢ A.
This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that there are other ways to replace the strong quantifiers in a formula and
obtain an equiderivable formula in which all quantifiers are weak. In this paper we present such a method.
In classical logic skolemization is a method that applies to formulas in prenex normal form, and since every formula has
a prenex normal form, the method implicitly applies to all formulas. But in general in nonclassical theories formulas do not
have a prenex normal form. This, however, is not the reason for the incompleteness of skolemization in nonclassical theories.
For the absence of prenex normal forms can be overcome by skolemizing on the spot: instead of first putting a formula
in prenex normal form, one directly skolemizes the strong quantifiers in the formula, that is, the positive occurrences of
E-mail address: Rosalie.Iemhoff@phil.uu.nl.
0168-0072/$ – see front matter© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.apal.2010.09.005
202 R. Iemhoff / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 162 (2010) 201–212
universal quantifiers and the negative occurrences of existential quantifiers. For classical theories, this generalization of
skolemization is also sound and complete, but for many nonclassical theories it still is not.
In [4] an alternative skolemization method called eskolemization was introduced that, when restricted to existential
quantifiers, is sound and complete for intuitionistic existence logic IQCE, which is intuitionistic logic IQC extended by an
existence predicate E. In eskolemization strong existential quantifiers ∃xAx are replaced by Ec ∧ Ac , and strong universal
quantifiers ∀xAx by Ec → Ac , where c is a fresh constant not occurring in A. If the strong quantifiers occur in the scope of
weak quantifiers, functions are used instead of constants, in the same way as in skolemization. This method is sound for
intuitionistic existence logic, and it was shown in [4] that for strong existential quantifiers it is also complete:
⊢IQCE A ⇔⊢IQCE A∃,
where A∃ denotes the result of eskolemizing only the strong existential quantifiers in A. Since for formulas A not containing
E we also have
⊢IQC A ⇔⊢IQCE A,
this method can be viewed as an alternative skolemization method for pure intuitionistic logic as well, since it implies
⊢IQC A ⇔⊢IQCE A∃.
There are many examples that show that eskolemization is not complete for universal quantifiers, such as the double-
negation shift, ∀x¬¬Ax → ¬¬∀xAx, for which the eskolemization ∀x¬¬Ax → ¬¬(Ec → Ac) is derivable, while the
formula itself is not.
In a later paper [5], another method for removing strong quantifiers from formulas was introduced, which is sound and
complete for constructive theories in the same way as eskolemization is, but for all formulas. Under this translation, (·)o,
strong quantifiers are replaced by expressions that besides the existence predicate contain an order relation as well. The
method, called orderization, is sound and complete for the corresponding logic IQCO, which is intuitionistic existence logic
extended by an order relation:
⊢IQCO A ⇔⊢IQCO Ao.
Since also for this logic derivability in IQC equals derivability in IQCO, at least for formulas not containing the new symbols,
orderization could be viewed as an alternative skolemization method for IQC that applies to all formulas and all theories T
based on intuitionistic logic:
T ⊢IQC A ⇔ T ⊢IQCO Ao.
In this paperwe return to the eskolemizationmethod and try to see how far it can be applied in full.We introduce a property,
the witness property, which implies the completeness of eskolemization for all formulas. That is, for theories T satisfying
the witness property, we show that for all formulas A,
T ⊢IQC A ⇔ T ⊢IQCE A ⇔ T ⊢IQCE Ae,
where Ae denotes the eskolemization of A. As a corollary we obtain an analogue of the Herbrand theorem for universal
constructive theories, and show that there exists a propositional formula A′, which is the result of replacing the weak
quantifiers by term instantiations, such that
T ⊢IQC A ⇔ T ⊢IQCE Ae ⇔ T ⊢IQCE A′.
Thus, as for classical logic, we obtain a correspondence between a constructive theory and its propositional fragment. We
apply the results to the theory of equality and the theory of monadic predicates.
There are other answers to the failure of skolemization in nonclassical settings. Several results have been obtained here,
especially for modal logic, intuitionistic logic, and fuzzy logics. In modal logic, analogues of skolemization and Herbrand’s
theorem are presented in [11]. As in eskolemization, the language is extended and, using this extra expressive power, a
method for removing strong quantifiers from formulas is introduced that is sound and complete and allows for a Herbrand-
like theorem.
In the context of fuzzy logics, one of the first questions that was addressed is that of for which fragments skolemization is
complete, and whether there is a corresponding Herbrand theorem. For intuitionistic logic, a large class of formulas belongs
to this fragment, and satisfies a Herbrand theorem [13,14,16]. For Gödel logic, it is proved in [1,2,9] that this fragment at least
contains all formulas in prenex normal form, and also that the Herbrand theorem holds for prenex formulas. As is shown in
[7], Gödel logic is in fact the only fuzzy logic with a Herbrand theorem for its prenex fragment. For fuzzy logics for which
even that does not hold, there is the notion of an approximate Herbrand theorem that could be used instead. This approach
first occurred in [18], for Łukasiewicz logic, and has recently been extended to other fuzzy logics based on continuous t-
norms, such as basic logic and product logic [8]. Thus the search for alternatives to skolemization and Herbrand theorems
continues, and who knows what surprising new solutions the future has in store for us?
The paper is built up as follows. In Section 2 we introduce sequent calculi LJE and LJEL for existence logic, and in
Section 2.3 we discuss theories over this logic. In Section 3 we recall the Kripke semantics for existence logic. In Section 4
we introduce the eskolemization method, which in Section 5 is shown to be sound and complete for theories satisfying the
witness property. In Section 6we prove the Herbrand theorems, and in Section 7we apply the results to several constructive
theories.
I thank Matthias Baaz and Norbert Preining for interesting discussions during a much enjoyed visit to Vienna.
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Ax Γ , P ⇒ P,∆ (P atomic) L⊥ Γ ,⊥ ⇒ ∆
Γ , A, B ⇒ ∆
L∧
Γ , A ∧ B ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ A,∆ Γ ⇒ B,∆
R∧
Γ ⇒ A ∧ B,∆
Γ , A ⇒ ∆ Γ , B ⇒ ∆
L∨
Γ , A ∨ B ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ A, B,∆
R∨
Γ ⇒ A ∨ B,∆
Γ , A → B ⇒ A,∆ Γ , B ⇒ ∆
L→
Γ , A → B ⇒ ∆
Γ , A ⇒ B
R→
Γ ⇒ A → B,∆
Γ ,∀xAx, At ⇒ ∆ Γ ,∀xAx ⇒ Et,∆
L∀
Γ ,∀xAx ⇒ ∆
Γ , Ey ⇒ Ay
R∀
Γ ⇒ ∀xA[x/y],∆
Γ , Ay, Ey ⇒ ∆
L∃
Γ , ∃xA[x/y] ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ A,∆ Γ , A ⇒ ∆
Cut
Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ At, ∃xAx,∆ Γ ⇒ Et, ∃xAx,∆
R∃
Γ ⇒ ∃xAx,∆
Fig. 1. The sequent calculus LJE. (In L∃ and R∀, y does not occur free in Γ and∆.)
2. The proof system
Wework with two languages,L andLe.L can be any language for predicate logic not containing E that contains at least
one constant. Le can be any language for predicate logic that contains L and a unary predicate E, the existence predicate,
and, for every arity, infinitely many functions of that arity. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, formulas and theories are in
Le, where it is assumed that there are always infinitely many functions of every arity that do not occur in the axioms of a
theory, so that there are enough functions available to use as Skolem functions. As we will see in the definition of existence
logic, given the existence predicate, terms, including variables, typically range over existing as well as non-existing objects,
while the quantifiers range over existing objects only.
Sequents are expressions of the form Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ and∆ range over finite sets of formulas. They are interpreted as
I(Γ ⇒ ∆) = (Γ →∆).
Positive and negative occurrences of formulas in sequents are inductively defined as follows. Given a sequent S = (Γ ⇒
∆), all formulas in ∆ occur positively in S, and all formulas in Γ occur negatively in S. If A ∧ B, A ∨ B, ∀xAx or ∃xAx occur
positively (negatively) in S, then A occurs positively (negatively) in S. If A → B occurs positively (negatively) is S, then
B occurs positively (negatively) in S and A occurs negatively (positively) in S. The strong quantifiers in a sequent are the
positive occurrences of universal quantifiers and the negative occurrences of existential quantifiers. The weak quantifiers
are the quantifiers that are not strong.
2.1. The calculus LJE
The sequent calculus LJE (Fig. 1) is an analogue of LJ that includes the existence predicate E and formalizes the intuition
that Et means t exists. A single-succedent version of the calculus has been introduced in [3]. The system has no rules for
weakening and contraction, but these are admissible. A proof system for existence logic was first introduced by Scott in
[19], but then in a Hilbert-style formulation.
We let LJEex and LJdec be, respectively, the systems LJE and LJ extended by the following rules, where P ranges over
atomic formulas different from E (‘‘ex’’ standing for both existence and excluded middle, and ‘‘dec’’ for decidability):
Γ , P ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ¬P,∆
Γ ⇒ P,∆
Γ ,¬P ⇒ ∆
2.2. The calculus LJEL
In the calculus LJE, for no term is it assumed that it exists. This implies that one cannot derive formulas such as⇒ ∃xEx
or ∀xPx ⇒ Pt , although one can derive ∀xPx, Et ⇒ Pt . This, of course, is undesirable, but as we will see, it is crucial in
eskolemization that not all terms do exist, that is, that not for all terms t is it the case that Et derivable. This is the reason
for working with two languages: all terms of the language L exist, while the terms in Le\L do not. That is, we add the
following set of axioms to LJE:
AxL ≡def {Γ ⇒ Et,∆ | t is a closed term inL and Γ and∆ are multisets}.
LJEL is LJE extended by AxL, and LJEexL is defined similarly. We write ⊢, ⊢ex, ⊢LJ, and ⊢dec for derivability in respectively
LJEL, LJEexL , LJ and LJ
dec.
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Recall that L contains at least one constant. Therefore AxL contains at least one sequent, which implies that (⇒
∃xEx ∧ ∀xEx) is derivable. In [3] single-succedent versions of LJE and LJEL have been introduced that satisfy a similar
kind of cut-elimination as LJE and LJEL. Also, these systems are well-behaved in the sense that they have interpolation and
the Beth property, and a decidable quantifier-free fragment.
2.3. Theories
The theories that we consider are inLe and defined over the logic LJEL, unless explicitly stated otherwise. If a theory is
said to be in L we consider it a theory over LJ. We assume that every theory is axiomatized over one of the logics by a set
of sequents, that is, the theories do not contain additional rules. Since every theory is equivalent to such a theory, this does
not exclude any theories, but just facilitates the arguments below. All theories that we will consider are closed in the sense
that the free variables in the axioms are considered to be universally quantified, or equivalently, that wemay substitute any
term for them. Of course, in the context of LJ these terms belong to L, while in the context of LJE they belong to Le and
have to exist, as quantifiers range over existing objects only. This implies that we have to change the axioms slightly if we
consider a theory over LJ a theory over LJE. We explain how.
Given a theory T in L, T dec is the theory in which the logic LJ is replaced by LJdec, and T e (T ex) is the theory in which
the logic LJ is replaced by LJEL (LJEexL ), and the axioms Γ ⇒ ∆ of T that are not part of the underlying logic by Ex¯,Γ ⇒ ∆,
where x¯ are all the free variables in Γ ⇒ ∆. Note that T e ⊢ex equals T ex ⊢.
Thus under these conventions, in going from T to T e or T ex, an axiom of the form⇒ Bx is replaced by Ex ⇒ Bx, and
stands for⇒ ∀xBx. This is the reason for adding Ex¯ to the antecedents of the axioms: the quantifier ∀ ranges over existing
objects, and if we did not add Ex¯, we could derive Bt also for terms t that do not exist.
A theory is atomic if it is axiomatized by sequents in which only atomic formulas occur. A strong quantifier theory is
axiomatized by sequents without weak quantifiers.
It is easy to see that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1 ([3]). If a theory T and a closed sequent S are inL, then
T ⊢LJ S if and only if T e ⊢ S T ⊢dec S if and only if T e ⊢ex S.
2.4. Fragments
TheL-fragment is the set of sequents that are inL. The quantifier-free fragment of a theory consists of all quantifier-free
sequents in the language of the theory. In the strong quantifier fragment (sq) the sequents do not contain weak quantifiers.
In the strong existential weak quantifier fragment (sewq) the sequents do not contain strong universal quantifiers. The strong
existential quantifier fragment (seq) is the intersection of the sq and the sewq fragment. In the no nesting of strong quantifiers
in the scope of weak quantifiers fragment (nnswq) the sequents do not contain strong quantifiers that are in the scope of weak
quantifiers.
3. Models
In the completeness proof below, Kripkemodels for the logic LJEL are used, and in this sectionwe describe thesemodels.
They are close to regular Kripke models, the only difference being that the existence predicate is used in the forcing of
quantifiers. Because of the existence predicate, we can without loss of generality assume that the models have constant
domains: since quantifiers are assumed to range over existing objects, k  Edwill replace d ∈ Dk.
A classical existence model is a classical model for Le defined in the usual way, with the additional requirement that the
interpretation of the existence predicate is nonempty. To fix the notation we spell out the definition. The model consists of
a pair (D, I), where D is a set and I a map onLe such that I(E) is a nonempty unary predicate on D, for every n-ary predicate
P inLe, I(P) is an n-ary predicate on D, and for every n-ary function f inLe, I(f ) is an n-ary function from Dn to D (constants
are 0-ary functions). I is extended to the interpretation of formulas in the standard way. For terms ti, I(t1, . . . , tn) is short
for I(t1), . . . , I(tn). d¯ ∈ Dmeans that di ∈ D for all di in the sequence d¯.
A Kripke existence model is a quadruple K = (W ,4,D, I), where (W ,4) is a rooted frame, D a nonempty set, the domain,
and I a collection {Ik | k ∈ W } such that the (D, Ik) are classical existence models satisfying the persistency requirements,
which means that for terms t¯(x¯) and predicates P(x¯)we have
k 4 l ⇒ ∀d¯ ∈ D : (D, Ik) |= P(d¯) ⇒ (D, Il) |= P(d¯)
k 4 l ⇒ ∀d¯ ∈ D : Ik(t¯(d¯)) = Il(t¯(d¯)).
In particular, Ik(t) = Il(t) for all closed terms t , since frames are rooted. When it is clear from the context that we work in
Le and not inLwe talk about (Kripke) models instead of Kripke existence models.
Given a Kripke existence model K = (W ,4,D, I), the forcing relation is defined as follows. For predicates P(t¯(x¯)) in Le
(including E), where x¯ are the free variables in the terms t¯ ,
∀d¯ ∈ D : K , k  P(t¯(d¯)) ≡def (D, Ik) |= P(t¯(d¯)).
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We define  in the usual way for connectives, but differently for the quantifiers:
k  ∃xA(x) ⇔ ∃d ∈ D k  Ed ∧ A(d)
k  ∀xA(x) ⇔ ∀d ∈ D : k  Ed → A(d).
Note that
k  ∀xA(x) ⇔ ∀l < k∀d ∈ D l  Ed → Ad.
A formula A(x¯) is forced in K , K  A(x¯), if for all a¯ ∈ D, A(a¯) is forced at all nodes. A sequent S = (Γ ⇒ ∆) is forced, when
I(S) is forced. K is anL-modelwhen it forces all sequents in AxL. K is a tree if its frame is a tree. It iswell-founded if its frame
has no infinite descending chains, and conversely well-founded if its frame has no infinite ascending chains. Finite models
are obviously conversely well-founded and well-founded.
Theorem 1 ([4]). For all theories T and all closed sequents S, T ⊢ S if and only if K  S for allL-models K that are well-founded
trees and force T .
Since T ex can be viewed as a theory over LJE that contains for all atomic formulas P(x¯), the axiom⇒ ∀x¯(P(x¯)∨¬P(x¯)),
the previous theorem implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For all theories T and all closed sequents S, T ⊢ex S if and only if K  S for all L-models K that are well-founded
trees and force T ex.
3.1. Correspondence
There is a natural correspondence between Kripke models K in the usual sense, for L, and Kripke existence models K e
for Le. K and K e only differ in their domains and the language in which they are models: if the Dk are domains of K , then
the domain of K e is

Dk, and the existence predicate and the domains of K are connected in the following way:
K e, k  Ed ⇔ d ∈ Dk.
The interpretations ofK e are extensions of the interpretations ofK toLe that interpret all functions inLe\L as the identity on
D, and all predicates inLe\L, except E, as empty (in fact, one could interpret them using arbitrary functions and predicates
on D). The following lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma 2. For all closed sequents S inL, we have K , k  S ⇔ K e, k  S.
Proof. It suffices to show by induction that K , k  Γ ⇒ ∆ if and only if K e, k  Et¯,Γ ⇒ ∆, where the t¯ are all terms that
occur in Γ ⇒ ∆. 
A similar correspondence between Kripke models with and without constant domains can be found in the paper [12] by
Dick de Jongh.
3.2. The witness property
In this section we introduce a semantical property that is a sufficient condition for the completeness of eskolemization
for a theory.
Given a formula Ax, an existence Kripke model has the A-witness property if it is a well-founded tree and the following
holds:
k ̸ ∀xAx ⇒ ∃d∃l < kl ̸ Ad and l  Ed ∧ (Ad → ∀xAx).
If the model satisfies this property for all formulas A it has the witness property. A theory has the (A-)witness property if it
is sound and complete with respect to a class of models that satisfy the (A-)witness property.
The name of the property corresponds to the fact that Ad functions as a witness of ∀xAx along any branch through l:
Ed → Ad is forced exactly where ∀xAx is forced. The well-foundedness implies that there is a witness for formulas ∃xAx too:
if it is forced along a branch, there is a lowest node where it is forced, say Ed ∧ Ad is forced there. Then along that branch,
∃xAx is forced exactly where Ed ∧ Ad is forced.
Below are examples of models with and without the witness property: the model in Fig. 2 has the witness property and
the two models in Fig. 3 do not. Note that in the left model in Fig. 3 ¬∀xA(x) is forced, and in the right model¬¬∀xA(x).
In the introduction we saw that the double-negation shift , ∀x¬¬Ax ⇒ ¬¬∀xAx, is a counterexample to the completeness
of eskolemization, since it is not derivable in intuitionistic existence logic while its eskolemized version, the sequent
∀x¬¬Ax ⇒ ¬¬(Ec → Ac), clearly is. As we will see, eskolemization is complete for theories with the witness property.
Therefore such theories should prove the double-negation shift, which is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Every theory with the witness property derives the double-negation shift.
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k2  Ed ∧ Ad ∧ ∀xAx k3  Ed ∧ ¬Ad ∧ ¬∀xAx
k1  Ed ∧ (Ad → ∀xAx)
iSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
5jjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
k0 ̸ ∀xAx
O
Fig. 2. A model that has the witness property.
k  ∀xA(x)
.
.
.
.
.
.
O
k2  A(d1)
O
k2  A(d1)
O
k1  A(d0)
O
k1  A(d0)
O
k0
O
k0
O
Fig. 3. Two models that do not have the witness property. Their domain is {d0, d1, . . . }, Edi is forced at all nodes, and  A(di) is written at the first node
where it is forced.
Proof. It suffices to show that every model K satisfying the witness property is a model of the double-negation shift. We
therefore assume that k in K forces ∀x¬¬Ax, and show that for all l < k there exists a node m < l that forces ∀xAx. Let
l < k. If l forces ∀xAxwe are done. If not, the witness property implies that there exists a nodem < l that, for some d, forces
Ed∧ (Ad → ∀xAx) and not Ad. Since k forces ∀x¬¬Ax, it follows thatm forces¬¬Ad, and hence also¬¬∀xAx. Thus there is
a node abovem, and hence above l, that forces ∀xAx, which is what we had to show. 
That the converse of this lemma does not hold is illustrated by the rightmost model in Fig. 3, which is a model of the
double-negation shift, but does not satisfy the witness property. The following theorem shows that many models have the
witness property.
Lemma 4. Every tree model that is well-founded and conversely well-founded has the witness property. In particular every finite
model does. Thus every theory with the finite model property satisfies the witness property.
4. Eskolemization
In this sectionwe recall the eskolemization procedure introduced in [4]. The eskolem sequence of a formula A is a sequence
of formulas A = A1, . . . , An = Ae such that An does not contain any strong quantifiers and Ai+1 is the result of replacing the
first strong quantifier QxB(x) in Ai (when reading Ai from left to right) by
Ef (y1, . . . , yn)→ B

f (y1, . . . , yn)

if Q = ∀, and by
Ef (y1, . . . , yn) ∧ B

f (y1, . . . , yn)

if Q = ∃,
where f ∈ Le\L does not occur in Ai, and theweak quantifiers in the scope of whichQxB(x) occurs are exactlyQy1, . . . ,Qyn.
If we work in the context of a theory T , it is also assumed that the Skolem functions f do not occur in the axioms of T . The
notion is extended to sequents in a straightforward way: if S = (Γ ⇒ ∆) and I(Γ ⇒ ∆)e = I(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′), then
Se ≡def (Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′). This transformation (·)e on formulas and sequents is called existence skolemization, or eskolemization for
short.
Note that ifQxB(x) is not in the scope ofweak quantifiers, then f is a constant, and that given S, Se is unique up to renaming
of the Skolem functions. Therefore we speak of the eskolemization of a sequent.
Observe that classical skolemization is existence skolemization without the existence predicate, that is, without
‘‘Ef (y1, . . . , yn)→’’ and ‘‘Ef (y1, . . . , yn)∧’’.
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Clearly, ⊢LJE A ⇒ Ae. Hence also
⊢ S ⇒⊢ Se.
Here follow some examples of eskolemization (P and Q are unary predicates):
S = ∃xPx ⇒ ∀xQx Se = Ec ∧ Pc ⇒ Ed → Qd
S = ∀x∃yR(x, y)⇒ Se = ∀x(Ef (x) ∧ R(x, f (x)))⇒
Using the completeness result in [4] it can be shown that
⊬ ∀x(Ax ∨ B)⇒ (∀xAx ∨ B) ⊬ ∀x(Ax ∨ B)⇒ ((Ec → Ac) ∨ B)
⊬ ¬¬∃xAx → ∃x¬¬Ax ⊬ ¬¬(Ec → Ac)→ ∃x¬¬Ax.
Thus although these sequents are counterexamples to the completeness of skolemization, since IQC derives∀x(Ax∨B)⇒
(Ac ∨ B) and ¬¬Ac → ∃x¬¬Ax, they are no longer so for eskolemization. That eskolemization is still not complete with
respect to all formulas is illustrated by the double-negation shift, whichwas discussed in the section on thewitness property.
As mentioned in the introduction, an alternative skolemization method was developed in [5] that applies to all constructive
theories, and therefore covers more theories than the ones discussed in this paper.
5. Completeness
In this section we prove the completeness of eskolemization with respect to theories that satisfy the witness property.
We treat the existential and universal quantifiers separately, in Lemmas 5 and 6. They state that for S ′ being the result of
replacing a strong existential quantifier∃xA(x) by Ef (y¯)∧A(f (y¯)), or a strong universal quantifier∀xA(x) by Ef (y¯)→ A(f (y¯)),
it holds that
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ S ′. (1)
Lemma 5, treating the existential quantifier, has been proved before, both semantically and syntactically [4,6]. Here we
present a somewhat different semantical proof, because in this form it resembles the universal case. Also, the proof for the
existential quantifier is simpler, and might help the reader to better understand the proof for the universal quantifier.
We first sketch the idea of the proof before we proceed with the technical details. The direction from left to right of
(1) is straightforward. For the other direction we restrict ourselves to the case where f is a constant c; the general case
will be treated in the proofs. We consider a countermodel K = (W ,4, I,D) to S, and from this construct a countermodel
K ′ = (W ,4, I ′,D′) to S ′. D′ consists of all closed terms in D∪Le, and terms are interpreted as themselves in K ′. To make K ′
into a countermodel to S ′ we define the forcing in K ′ in such a way that Ec ∧ Ac is forced in K ′ at exactly those nodes where
∃xAx is forced in K , or in the universal case, Ec → Ac is forced in K ′ at exactly those nodes where ∀xAx is forced in K . If the
forcing of other formulas remains unchanged, K ′ will indeed be a countermodel to S ′.
To define the forcing in K ′, we choose for every node k an element ck in D∪ {c}, which will correspond to c in the forcing
at k in K ′. In the case of the existential quantifier we consider the lowest nodes kwhere ∃xA(x) is forced, and pick an element
e ∈ D such that Ee∧ A(e) is forced at k, and put cl = e for all nodes l < k. In the case of the universal quantifier we consider
the lowest nodes kwhere, for some e ∈ D, Ae is not forced while Ee and (Ae → ∀xAx) are, and put cl = e for all nodes l < k.
In both cases, for all nodes l not yet treated, we put cl = c. Note that in the latter case cl ∉ D, while in the former case cl ∈ D.
That such nodes k and elements e exist follows from the fact that the models satisfy the witness property.
When we have treated all branches in this way, we have defined ck for all k in K . Given a term d in D∪Le, dk denotes the
term in which c is replaced by ck, and d¯k is short for (d1)k, . . . , (dn)k. The forcing of atomic formulas is defined as follows.
∀d¯ ∈ D′ :

K ′, k  P(d¯) ⇔ K , k  P(d¯k) if d¯k ∈ D
K ′, k ̸ P(d¯) otherwise.
Thus at the nodes where ck = c , all atomic formulas containing c are not forced at that node. At the other nodes, the forcing
is inherited from K , where c is replaced by ck. It will be shown in the completeness proofs that c has the desired properties:
Ec ∧ A(c) or Ec → A(c) is forced in K ′ exactly where ∃xA(x) or ∀xA(x) is forced in K .
For the case in which we deal with an n-ary Skolem function f instead of a constant, we have to choose elements
corresponding to f (d¯) at every node in themodel.We therefore construct amapw : W×(D′)n → D′ and let f (d¯) correspond
tow⟨k, d¯⟩ in the forcing at k in K ′. This completes the sketch of the proof, and we continue with the technical details.
5.1. Companions
Since the construction of themodel K ′ does not depend on the formof the quantifier thatwe are considering, we treat this
construction separately in this section. Suppose ann-ary function f , amodelK = (W ,4, I,D), and amapw : W×(D′)n → D′
are given. The set of closed terms in (D∪Le)\{f } is denoted by C. The model K ′ = (W ,4, I ′,D′) that we are going to define
is called the f -companion of K . In the completeness proof we will constructw is such a way that
k 4 l ∧ w⟨k, d¯⟩ ∈ C ⇒ w⟨k, d¯⟩ = w⟨l, d¯⟩. (2)
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The domain D′ of K ′ is the set of closed terms in D ∪ Le, and terms are interpreted as themselves. To define the forcing of
atomic formulas we inductively define for every k ∈ W the following translation dk on D′.
dk =

d if d ∈ D
Ik(d) if d is a constant inLe
Ik(g(e¯k)) if d = g(e¯), e¯k ∈ C, and g ≠ f
w⟨k, e¯k⟩ if d = f (e¯) and e¯k ∈ C
f (c¯) if d = g(e¯) for some g ∈ Le, and e¯k ∉ C.
Here c¯ denotes some fixed sequence of n elements in D′. Recall that d¯k denotes (d1)k, . . . , (dn)k. Observe that if d does not
contain f , dk ∈ C. The forcing of atomic formulas P(x¯), including E, is defined in the following way.
∀d¯ ∈ D′ :

K ′, k  P(d¯) ⇔ K , k  P(d¯k) if d¯k ∈ C
K ′, k ̸ P(d¯) otherwise.
The upwards persistency requirement for atomic formulas, and hence for all formulas, is satisfied, because (2) implies
k 4 l ∧ dk ∈ C ⇒ dk = dl. (3)
That the upwards persistency requirement is also satisfied for terms follows from the fact that terms are interpreted as
themselves in K ′. Also note that
K ′, k  Ed ⇔ dk ∈ C ∧ K , k  Edk. (4)
This model K ′, the f -companion of K , is the main ingredient in the following two lemmas, which together form the
completeness proof.
5.2. The completeness proof
Lemma 5. If T is a theory, S a closed sequent, ∃xAx is an occurrence of a strong existential quantifier in S, and S ′ is the result of
replacing this occurrence by Ef (y¯)∧Af (y¯), where y¯ are the variables of all the weak quantifiers in the scope of which ∃xAx occurs,
and f ∈ Le\L does not occur in S, then
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ S ′.
Proof. The non-trivial part is to show that T ⊬ S implies T ⊬ S ′. Since this is a semantical proof, it is more convenient to
consider sentences rather than sequents. Therefore let C = I(S), and C ′ = I(S ′), and suppose there is an L-model K of T
that refutes C . By Theorem 1 we can assume that K is a well-founded tree. We will define a mapw : W × (D′)n → D′ such
that the corresponding f -companion K ′ refutes C ′. We assume that y¯ consists of one variable, the general case being similar.
Thus A = A(x, y). The set of closed terms in (D ∪Le)\{f } is denoted by C.
w will be defined in stages,wi : W × D′i → D′, where D′i are the terms of depth i in D′, andw =

wi, that is, for d ∈ D′i ,
w⟨k, d⟩ = wi⟨k, d⟩. For d ∈ D′i , we define dik as in the definition of the f -companion, but then relativized to wi. Thus for d a
constant in D ∪Le, we define
d0k =

d if d ∈ D
Ik(d) if d is a constant inLe.
And givenwi and d ∈ D′i+1, di+1k is defined as follows, where d¯jk is short for (d1)jk, . . . , (dn)jk.
di+1k =
Ik(g(e¯
i
k)) if d = g(e¯), e¯ik ∈ C, and g ≠ f
wi⟨k, e⟩ if d = f (e) and eik ∈ C
f (a) if d = g(e¯) for some g ∈ Le, and e¯ik ∉ C.
Here a denotes some fixed element in D′; it does not matter which one. Note that for all d ∈ D′0, d0k is defined, and if wi is
defined, then so is di+1k for all d ∈ D′i+1. This implies that the following inductive definition of the wi is well-defined. For
i ≥ 0 and d ∈ D′i ,wi is defined as follows.
(a) Consider the lowest nodes k in K for which dik ∈ C and ∃xA(x, dik) is forced at k in K . This means that for no node l below
one of these k’s do we have dil ∈ C and l forces ∃xA(x, dil). For all these lowest nodes k we pick an element ck ∈ D for
which k forces Eck∧A(ck, dik) and putwi⟨l, d⟩ = ck for all l < k. Note that because K is well-founded, such a node k exists
along every branch unless for all nodes l along the branch either dil ∉ C or l ̸ ∃xA(x, dil).
(b) For all k and d ∈ D′i for whichwi⟨k, d⟩ is not defined in (a), putwi⟨k, d⟩ = f (d).
Note thatwi is indeed a map: for all k and d ∈ D′i ,wi⟨k, d⟩ is not defined twice, as K is a tree.
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The case where f has larger arity than 1 is similar to the case that we consider here. For the case where f is a constant,
the definition of w0 has to be changed accordingly. This was explained in the proof sketch above. It is easy to show with
induction on i that for d ∈ D′i , dk, as defined in the definition of f -companion, equals dik.
In the following observations we use that in the definition of wi, in (a) we have wi⟨k, d⟩ ∈ D ⊆ C, and in (b) we have
wi⟨k, d⟩ ∉ C. It is easy to prove by induction onwi that
k 4 l ∧ w⟨k, d¯⟩ ∈ C ⇒ w⟨k, d¯⟩ = w⟨l, d¯⟩.
Hence (3). Recall that (4) holds too.
To complete the theorem it suffices to show that K ′, k  C ′ ⇔ K , k  C and that K ′ is a model of T . We first show that
for all formulas B,
∀d¯k ∈ C : K ′, k  B(d¯) ⇔ K , k  B(d¯k). (5)
We prove this by induction on the complexity of B. If B is a predicate, the definition of the forcing of atomic formulas in K ′
applies. Conjunction, disjunction, and implication are straightforward. Note that for implication we use (3). We treat the
quantifiers, where we suppress d¯.
∀⇒: If K , k ̸ ∀zB(z), then there is some l < k and e ∈ D such that K , l  Ee and K , l ̸ B(e). Since e ∈ D, el = e and thus
el ∈ C. Therefore K ′, l  Ee and K ′, l ̸ B(e) by the induction hypothesis. Hence K ′, k ̸ ∀zB(x).
⇐: If K ′, k ̸ ∀zB(z), then there is some l < k and e ∈ D′ such that K ′, l  Ee and K ′, l ̸ B(e). Hence el ∈ C by (4). Thus
K , l  Eel and K , l ̸ B(el) by the induction hypothesis. Hence K , k ̸ ∀zB(x).
∃: This follows from the induction hypothesis in the same way as for the universal quantifier. This proves (5). From this it
follows that K ′ is a model of T .
It remains to show that
∀ek ∈ C : K ′, k  Ef (e) ∧ A(f (e), e) ⇔ K , k  ∃xA(x, ek). (6)
For, together with (5), a straightforward induction on subformulas of C that are not subformulas of A(x, y) shows that
K ′, k  C ′ ⇔ K , k  C . The proof of (6) runs as follows.
⇒: Suppose K ′, k  Ef (e)∧ A(f (e), e). K ′, k  Ef (e) implies f (e)k ∈ C by (4). Thus by (5) K , k  Ef (e)k ∧ A(f (e)k, ek), which
implies that K , k  ∃xA(x, ek).
⇐: Suppose K , k  ∃xA(x, ek). By the definition of w there exists a lowest node l 4 k for which el ∈ C, and for which
for some c ∈ D, K , l  Ec ∧ A(c, el), and w⟨m, e⟩ = c for all m < l. Note that since el ∈ C and l 4 k, ek = el. Hence
K , k  Ec ∧ A(c, ek). Since el ∈ C and l 4 k, we have f (e)k = f (e)l = w⟨l, e⟩ = c , and thus K ′, k  Ef (e) ∧ A(f (e), e) by
(5). 
Lemma 6. If a theoryT satisfies the A-witness property, S is a closed sequent,∀xAx is an occurrence of a strong universal quantifier
in S, and S ′ is the result of replacing this occurrence by Ef (y¯)→ Af (y¯), where y¯ are the variables of all the weak quantifiers in the
scope of which ∀xAx occurs, and f ∈ Le\L does not occur in S, then
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ S ′.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the previous lemma, except that the countermodel K that we consider now is a
model that has the A-witness property. Recall that this implies that it is a well-founded tree. Again we assume that f is a
unary function. The only difference lies in the definition of wi and the proof of (6). In the definition of wi only the case (a)
differs, which is replaced by the following:
(a) Consider the lowest nodes k in K for which dik ∈ C, and for some c ∈ D, k forces Ec and A(c, dik) → ∀xA(x, dik) but not
A(c, dik). This means that for no node l below one of the k’s is there an e ∈ D such that l forces Ee and A(e, dil)→ ∀xA(x, dil)
but not A(e, dil). For all these lowest nodes kwe pick an element c
k ∈ D such that k forces Eck and A(ck, dik)→ ∀xA(x, dik)
but not A(ck, dik), and putwi⟨l, d⟩ = ck for all l < k.
Thatwi is indeed a map, that is, for all k and d ∈ D′i ,wi⟨k, d⟩ is not defined twice, is not difficult to see. It is easy to show by
induction on i that for d ∈ D′i , dk, as defined in the definition of f -companion, equals dik, and that
k 4 l ∧ w⟨k, d¯⟩ ∈ C ⇒ w⟨k, d¯⟩ = w⟨l, d¯⟩.
To complete the theorem it suffices to show that K ′, k  C ′ ⇔ K , k  C and that K ′ is a model of T . As in the proof of the
existential quantifier, it suffices to show that
∀d¯k ∈ C : K ′, k  B(d¯) ⇔ K , k  B(d¯k), (7)
and that
∀ek ∈ C : K ′, k ̸ Ef (e)→ A(f (e), e) ⇔ K , k ̸ ∀xA(x, ek). (8)
The proof of (7) is the same as the proof of (5) in the previous lemma. As in the existential case, (7) implies that K ′ is a model
of T , and together with (8) it implies K ′, k  C ′ ⇔ K , k  C .
Thus it remains to show (8).
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⇒: Let l < k be such that K ′, l  Ef (e) and K ′, l ̸ A(f (e), e). Since ek ∈ C, el = ek by (3). Also, l  Ef (e) implies f (e)l ∈ C by
(4). Thus by the induction hypothesis K , l  Ef (e)l and K , l ̸ A(f (e)l, el), which implies that K , k ̸ ∀xA(x, ek).⇐: Suppose K , k ̸ ∀xA(x, ek). By the witness property there exists a node m < k such that for some b ∈ D, m forces Eb
and A(b, ek) → ∀xA(x, ek), but not A(b, ek). Note that ek = em ∈ C. Because K is a well-founded tree, there is a smallest
such node l 4 m for which el ∈ C, and which forces Ec and A(c, el) → ∀xA(x, el), but not A(c, el), for some c ∈ D. The
definition of w implies that for some c with this property, w⟨n, e⟩ = c for all n < l. Thus f (e)l = c ∈ C. Hence by (7),
K ′, l  Ef (e) and K ′, l ̸ A(f (e), e). Thus K ′, l ̸ Ef (e) → A(f (e), e). We have to show that K ′, k ̸ Ef (e) → A(f (e), e). We
distinguish the cases k 4 l and l ≺ k. The first case is immediate. If l ≺ k, then K ′, k  Ef (e). From el = ek it follows that
K , k  A(c, ek)→ ∀xA(x, ek). Since K , k ̸ ∀xA(x, ek), also K , k ̸ A(c, ek). Since f (e)k = f (e)l = c , K ′, k ̸ A(f (e), e) by (7).
Hence K ′, k ̸ Ef (e)→ A(f (e), e). 
Lemmas 1 and 4–6 imply the following theorems. Note that the theories in the theorems include theories of the form
T ex or T dec , that is, whose logic is LJEexL or LJ
dec.
Theorem 3. For every theory T with the witness property, and every closed sequent S,
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ Se.
Theorem 4. For every theory T and every closed sequent S in the sewq fragment,
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ Se.
Corollary 1. For every theory T with the finite model property, and every closed sequent S,
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ Se.
Corollary 2. For every theory T inL for which T e has the witness property, and every closed sequent S inL,
T ⊢LJ S ⇔ T e ⊢ S ⇔ T e ⊢ Se.
Corollary 3. The sq fragment of every theory with a decidable quantifier-free fragment and the witness property is decidable.
Corollary 4. The seq fragment of every theory with a decidable quantifier-free fragment is decidable. This also holds for theories
inL.
Note that it follows from Lemma 1 and Corollary 3 that for a theory T in L with a decidable quantifier-free fragment,
and for which T e has the witness property, the sqL-fragment is decidable.
6. Herbrand’s theorem
In the context of intuitionistic logic there is a natural analogue of Herbrand’s theorem. Following [10], we define an
analogue of the notion of ∧∨-expansion for the setting of existence logic. Given a theory T and a sequent S, let H(T , S)
be the Herbrand universe of (T , S), which consists of all terms generated by the constants and functions occurring in S or in
(the axioms of) T , that is,H(T , S) =Hi(T , S), where
H0(T , S) ≡def {t | t is a constant in S or T }
Hi+1(T , S) Hi(T , S) ∪ {f (t¯) | t¯ ∈ Hi(T , S) and f in S or in T }.
Note that terms in T include all terms inL, as theories contain the logic LJEL, in whose axioms all closed terms inL occur. A
sequent S ′ is an∧∨-expansion of a sequent S if every positive occurrence of an existential quantifier QxA(x) in S is replaced
by
n
i=1 Esi ∧ A(si) for some terms si ∈ H(T , S), and every negative occurrence of a universal quantifier QxA(x) is replaced
by
n
i=1(Eti → A(ti)) for some terms ti ∈ H(T , S). It is not difficult to prove the following analogues of Herbrand’s theorem.
Note that these theorems include theories of the form T ex.
Theorem 5. For every strong quantifier theory T and for every sequent S there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′ of S such that
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ S ′.
Theorem 6. For every strong quantifier theory T that has the witness property and for every S, there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′
of Se such that
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ Se ⇔ T ⊢ S ′.
Theorem 7. For every strong quantifier theory T and for every S in the sewq fragment, there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′ of Se
such that
T ⊢ S ⇔ T ⊢ Se ⇔ T ⊢ S ′.
Mints proved in [15] that the sq fragment of LJ is decidable. The above theorem holds in particular for empty T , but it does
not directly implyMints’ result for the seq fragment of LJ, as one has to bind the number of expansions of a sequent to obtain
it. This can be done, but because of lack of space we will not do so in this paper.
Corollary 5. For every strong quantifier theory T and for every S inL in the sewq fragment, there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′ of
Se such that
T ⊢LJ S ⇔ T e ⊢ Se ⇔ T e ⊢ S ′.
If T e also has the witness property this holds for all sequents S inL.
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7. Applications
Theorem 7 and Corollary 5 apply to many constructive theories, such as the theory of groups and the theory of apartness
as given in [21], and several order theories discussed in [17], and Theorem6obviously applies to all strong quantifier theories
with the finite model property. Of course, there are many theories without the witness property, but even for some of these
the results above can be obtained. We conclude the paper by discussing some typical examples of such theories.
7.1. Equality
Let iEq be the theory of intuitionistic equality without functions given by the following axioms over the logic LJ:
Axeq ≡def ⇒ t = t,
t = s ⇒ s = t,
r = s, s = t ⇒ r = t.
Thus iEqe is LJEL extended by the following axioms:
Axeq ≡def Γ , Et ⇒ t = t,∆
Γ , Et, Es, t = s ⇒ s = t,∆
Γ , Et, Es, Er, r = s, s = t ⇒ r = t,∆.
Because the theory iEqe contains the predicate E it should also contain the axiom Et, Es, t = s ⇒ Es, which is the translation
of the axiom t = s, Pt ⇒ Ps that holds in equality logic in the presence of predicates P . Since, however, this sequent is
already derivable in LJEL we do not have to include it in the axioms. We have to add the side formulas Γ and ∆ because
LJE does not contain weakening.
Corollary 4 and Theorem 7 imply the following.
Theorem 8. For every S in the sewqL-fragment, there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′ of Se such that
iEq ⊢LJ S ⇔ iEqe ⊢ S ⇔ iEqe ⊢ Se ⇔ iEqe ⊢ S ′.
For iEqdec and iEqex we obtain a full version of Herbrand’s theorem by using the following theorem of Craig Smoryński
that shows that every formula is equivalent to a formula in the nnswq fragment that contains no strong universal quantifiers.
Note that in the eskolemization of such formulas no functions occur.
Theorem 9 ([20]). In iEqdec every sequent S in L is equivalent to a sequent of the form ⇒ ni=1 Ai ∧ Bi, where the Ai are
conjunctions of atomic formulas and their negations, and the Bi are propositional combinations of the formula ∃x(x = x), denoted
by E1, and the formulas
En ∃x1 . . . xn

i≠j
xi ≠ xj (n > 1).
The sequent ⇒ni=1 Ai ∧ Bi is the normal form of S and denoted by Snf .
Corollary 6. For every S inL there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′ of Senf such that
iEqdec ⊢ S ⇔ iEqex ⊢ S ⇔ iEqex ⊢ Se ⇔ iEqex ⊢ S ′.
7.2. Monadic predicates
In the same way as for equality we can derive Herbrand theorems for the intuitionistic theory of monadic predicates
without functions, iMP, again using a theorem of Smoryński. Let Pi range over the predicates in the language.
Theorem 10. For every S in the sewq fragment and inL, there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′ of Se such that
iMP ⊢ S ⇔ iMPe ⊢ S ⇔ iMPe ⊢ Se ⇔ iMPe ⊢ S ′.
Theorem 11 ([20]). In iMPdec every sequent S inL is equivalent to a sequent⇒ni=1 Ai ∧ Bi, where the Ai are conjunctions of
atomic formulas and their negations, and the Bi are propositional combinations of the formulas
∃x

m
i=1
Pi(x) ∧
n
j=1
¬Pj(x)

.
The sequent ⇒ni=1 Ai ∧ Bi is the normal form of S and denoted by Snf .
Corollary 7. For every S inL there exists an ∧∨-expansion S ′ of Senf such that
iMPdec ⊢ S ⇔ iMPex ⊢ S ⇔ iMPex ⊢ Se ⇔ iMPex ⊢ S ′.
Smoryński uses Theorems 9 and 11 to prove that iEqdec and iMPdec are decidable. This does not follow directly from
Corollary 7, as one has to bind the number of expansions of a sequent to obtain it. This can be done, but because of lack of
space we will not do so in this paper.
Theorems similar to the ones discussed above could be obtained for other theories. The theories treated here are just
some typical examples of the possible applications of eskolemization.
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